The League of Nations & the Abyssinian Crisis · Revision Notes · History

Causes of the Abyssinian Crisis

A map showing Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia) and surrounding areas in East Africa in the 1930s.

The map includes Italian Somaliland, British Somalia, French Somalia, and Eritrea.

Italian territories are shaded in yellow.

Abyssinia is in the centre, bordered by Italy’s colonies on both the north (Eritrea) and the east (Italian Somaliland).

A small inset map of Africa highlights the region with a red box to show where Abyssinia is located on the continent. — A map showing the location of Abyssinia

Abyssinia was a country in the north-east of Africa
- It is now called Ethiopia
British, French and Italian colonies surrounded Abyssinia
- Despite this, Abyssinia maintained its independence

A flowchart explaining why Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935, broken into four categories:

Historical reasons:

Mussolini wanted to recreate the Roman Empire.

Abyssinia had defeated Italy in 1896.

Mussolini wanted to reverse this humiliation.

Economic reasons (Push and Pull):

Push: Italy had suffered from the Depression and wanted to grow its own raw materials.

Pull: Abyssinia had mineral resources and fertile land for livestock.

Geographical reasons:

Abyssinia bordered Italy’s colonies (Eritrea and Italian Somaliland).

Mussolini wanted to challenge Britain’s influence in East Africa.

He also believed Britain and France would not stop him because they wanted Italy as an ally. — A concept map showing the reasons why Italy invaded Abyssinia

Events of the Abyssinian Crisis

A flowchart showing the events of the Abyssinia Crisis (1934–1936) and how the League of Nations failed to stop Mussolini:

December 1934: A border clash happens at the Wal-Wal Oasis — 2 Italians and 150 Abyssinians are killed.

January to October 1935: Italy pretends to co-operate with the League but is secretly planning to invade.

October 1935: Italy invades Abyssinia using 250,000 soldiers and chemical weapons.

League’s response:

They condemn Italy’s actions and place economic sanctions.

BUT the sanctions do not include key materials like oil, iron, or steel.

Outcome:

In December 1935, the Hoare–Laval Pact (Britain and France secretly agreeing to give most of Abyssinia to Italy) is exposed and dropped due to public backlash.

In May 1936, Italy captures Addis Ababa, the capital of Abyssinia.

Stamp: “FAILURE” — to show the League did not stop the invasion. — A flowchart showing Italy’s actions in Abyssinia, the League’s reaction and the eventual outcome

Consequences of the Abyssinian Crisis

The Abyssinian Crisis highlighted the selfish interests of Britain and France
- The Hoare-Laval Pact aimed to give Mussolini what he wanted to protect Britain and France’s imperial interests in East Africa
- Britain and France avoided taking firm action against Italy
  - They did not close the Suez Canal
    - Italy continued to have sea access to Abyssinia
- Britain and France had just signed the Stresa Front (1935) with Mussolini
  - The Stresa Front was an agreement against Nazi Germany
    - This alliance seemed more important to France and Britain than protecting Abyssinia
  - Britain and France did not succeed in a long-lasting alliance with Italy
    - In 1936, Italy and Germany formed the Rome-Berlin Axis
The incident reconfirmed how weak the League was without the USA
- The USA sold oil to Italy
  - If the League placed oil sanctions on Italy, they feared that the USA would not support the League
  - As a result, Italy continued to have essential resources for war

Worked example

Study Sources C and D. Does Source C make Source D surprising? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge

8 marks

Source C: From the diary of Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to Britain, November 1935. Hoare was in charge of British foreign policy until December 1935, when he resigned

Hoare told me that the Italian demands remain unacceptable to Abyssinia, as they do to the League and Britain. I briefed Hoare on our position. We have no quarrels with Italy. We have no interests in Africa. If we are taking a stand against Italy, it is only as a loyal member of the League, and because we want to teach a lesson to serve as a warning for any future aggressors. Italy is not a very serious aggressor, but there are more dangerous candidates in the world. Hoare assured me that the British position is exactly the same. Britain has no interest of its own in the conflict. It is guided purely by loyalty to the League. Hoare, like me, does not regard Italy as a terrifying aggressor

Source D: From the memoirs of Anthony Eden, entitled Facing the Dictators, published in 1962. Eden was a leading member of the British government throughout the Abyssinian Crisis and became Foreign Secretary when Hoare resigned in December 1935. In this extract, he describes a meeting in April 1936

At a committee of the League Italy’s use of gas was discussed. France’s only contribution was to ask whether there was any enquiry into the Abyssinians’ use of dum-dum bullets and into the atrocities committed by them. I had to remind the French that the 1925 Gas Protocol, which had been signed by both Abyssinia and Italy, was absolute. There was no provision that the use of gas might be permitted on account of the methods of warfare adopted by the other side. During an adjournment, a private Anglo-French meeting was held. It showed no agreement was possible. I said that the League had lost greatly in prestige in many countries. A despairing message had been received from the Abyssinian government. I wanted to know if the Committee was to do no more than to suggest that its chairman should see the Italian representative and thus give the Italian government further opportunity for delay. I said that the threat of poison gas was not to Africa only. Dictator states might well use gas in Europe

Partial answer:

Source C does make Source D surprising as they disagree about how concerned League members were about the Abyssinian Crisis (1). Maisky in Source C states that “the Italian demands remain unacceptable… to the League and Britain”. However, Eden in Source D recounts that, on the issue of Italy’s use of gas, “no agreement was possible” with France (1). Eden, as a key British official during the Abyssinian Crisis, witnessed France’s lack of interest in the Abyssinian Crisis. Therefore, Source D more likely reflects the uncaring attitude of League members towards Abyssinia (1).

The League of Nations After 1936

After 1936, the League of Nations’ reputation was destroyed
- It had no authority over international relations
- It had no power or influence over aggressive countries
The world moved closer to a world war
- Hitler began an aggressive campaign of land expansion in Europe
  - The events of Manchuria and Abyssinia showed that Hitler could do whatever he wanted without consequences
The League failed to keep world peace
- In September 1939, Hitler’s invasion of Poland triggered the Second World War
  - During the Second World War, the League held no Assembly or Council meetings
  - The League disbanded in April 1946 and gave its powers to the United Nations
The League had success with its humanitarian commissions after 1936
- Some historians use this to argue that the League of Nations was not a total failure
  - The Permanent Court of Justice and the International Labour Organization became part of the United Nations
  - The Health Commission became the World Health Organization

Causes of the Abyssinian Crisis

Causes of the Abyssinian Crisis

Events of the Abyssinian Crisis

Events of the Abyssinian Crisis

Consequences of the Abyssinian Crisis

Consequences of the Abyssinian Crisis

The League of Nations After 1936

The League of Nations After 1936

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